How the FDLR and Burundi forces incited the M23 to march on Mubambiro, Goma

Established by military and paramilitary radicals connected to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsi, the FDLR is a terrorist group that has been placed on the US and UN blacklists.

Following an attack on M23 positions in the hills overlooking Minova, Bweramana, Sasha, Kirotshe, Sake, and Mubambiro areas in the South and North Kivu regions by the pro-Kinshasa alliance, he was speaking.

“They have been forced back everywhere,” Kaiko stated, mentioning Lumbishi, Ruzirantaka, Kamatale, Bitagata, and Kabingo as some of the regained regions.

However, Kaiko omitted to mention that Burundian troops spearheaded this offensive with assistance from members of the FDLR, a group that committed genocide.

Established by military and paramilitary radicals connected to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsi, the FDLR is a terrorist group that has been placed on the US and UN blacklists.

The group is at the center of the protracted conflict between Kinshasa and Kigali.

From their bases in Minova, including the elevated grounds of Gatare, Bombandana (Golgotha), Shingika, Buhamba, and Kasunyu, the Burundian troops and FDLR militia, in conjunction with the FARDC, had launched the onslaught.

The M23 launched the onslaught while adhering to a unilateral ceasefire intended to persuade the government of President Felix Tshisekedi to accept peace negotiations.

On March 22, the eve of the M23 anniversary, an M23 commander told this writer during a tour of Minova, “It was a huge offensive.”

“We were able to gain a tactical advantage by strategically retreating and luring them in.”

This coalition led by Burundi, which included the FDLR, briefly took over certain areas that M23 had previously controlled.

The officer who participated in these conflicts stated, under condition of anonymity since he was not authorized to speak about the subject, “Yeah, they did take a few places like Bitagata, Ngungu, and Murambi, but held them for just a few days, maybe three.”

The M23 launched their own counteroffensive after regrouping and receiving reinforcements.

FDLR and Burundian troops retreat when the M23 launches a counteroffensive.
It also turned out to be decisive.

The rebels expanded their area and pursued the opposing force southward, beyond Minova, and deep into South Kivu by January 17, after regaining the villages they had lost a few days before.

The source claimed that “the Burundians, FDLR, and FARDC all retreated and fled in disarray.” According to the M23 commander, “they not only lost the areas they had briefly occupied, but they also lost Minova and headed southward, towards Kavumu.”

About 45 kilometers south of Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, Minova is a strategically located town on Lake Kivu.

In the months preceding M23’s conquest of Goma in late January, the area provided Goma with necessities, including food, through the lake. The rebels had shut off the majority of the other supply channels.

After driving out its farmers, Burundian troops controlled Minova’s highlands for months. From there, they aimed to drive M23 out of the formidable Rukara, Muremure, and Ndumba hill range to the north of Minova.

Recapturing Rubaya in Masisi territory was their primary goal.

According to a former FDLR warrior who lived in Minova, the Burundian forces had developed a slight fascination with Rubaya, which the M23 had taken in May of last year, “because protecting Rubaya was their main task when they first deployed to North Kivu.”

M23 has previously denied claims that it captured Rubaya because of its abundant mineral resources, claiming the area has long been a sanctuary for violent militias and armed organizations and a significant cause of unrest for civilians.

The former FDLR combatant claimed that the primary reason “why Tshisekedi had agreed to pay the Burundian president heavily, it was more like a mercenary deal” was to protect Rubaya.

However, Minova’s offensives spearheaded by the FDLR and Burundi ultimately worked in favor of the M23, as the rebels retaliated forcefully.

A decisive, phased advance by the rebels

A stepwise method was used to plan the eventual rebel advance.

In phase I, the Burundians and their allies, especially the FDLR, will be counterattacked and pursued well beyond their Minova lines.

In fact, the coalition forces were had to withdraw to areas tens of kilometers south of Minova after momentarily driving out M23 units in Ngungu and the surrounding districts, giving the rebels the upper hand.

Around January 20, the M23 captured a number of other South Kivu locations, such as Lumbishi, Numbi, and Shanje, as well as Minova and Bweramana in the provinces of South Kivu and North Kivu, respectively.

For the M23, everything was going as planned.

Additionally, phase II had been set up.

An M23 soldier participated in these actions stated, “We were able to send a force across to Buzi-Bulengo peninsula, with artillery capabilities, once we took Minova and fully controlled the road from Sake to Minova.” “At last, it was time to take Mubambiro and Sake.”

Because it ignored the coalition soldiers at Mubambiro barracks to the northeast, the M23 unit’s deployment on the peninsula would turn out to be crucial. As an M23 mobile force moved toward Mubambiro from the hills to the north of the area, it assisted in diverting and even actively engaging the enemy forces there, primarily the artillery-armed SAMIDRC/SADC formations.

In their approach from the hills, the M23 soldiers in the highlands northeast of Minova, which strategically overlook Sake and Mubambiro (or Bambiro), would divide into three mobile groups, or battalions.

It was around January 23.

The M23 officer in charge of the troops that captured Mubambiro barracks, who held the rank of Major, stated that each battalion had a distinct task.

When Mubambiro fell

Mubambiro was to be taken by the first battalion.

On January 23, this mobile army launched a swift predawn attack across the hills of Nkingo, Mwambariro, Ngumba, Kiruku, Matcha, and Sake on route to Mubambiro, making every effort to avoid needless clashes.

Around 9 a.m. on the same day, it took control of Mubambiro/Bambiro barracks, and the second battalion joined it the next day, January 24.

Sake is overshadowed by the Kwa Madimba, Kimoka, and Majagi hills, through which the second battalion has marched.

An M23 soldier with the rank of captain stated, “The second battalion’s mission was to support the force that had advanced to Mubambiro while also clearing enemy pockets on their way.”

Bypassing Sake and Mubambiro to the south, the third mobile force, or battalion, moved toward Shove, which was formerly the residence of FDLR general commander Pacifique “Omega” Ntawunguka.

Through the foothills of Shove Mountain, Kimoka II, the northern flanks of Majagi, and the Goma-Mubambiro-Sake Road, this force made its way to Kasengese.

Along the route, this mobile force had to deal with several enemy forces, including FDLR deployments, just like the other battalions.

Last month, from the Mutobo transit camp in Musanze, a former FDLR fighter who has since returned to Rwanda informed The New Times that he had participated in M23 clashes near Sake.

SAMIDRC enters the battle.

The coalition reinforcements from Goma and the last-minute direct involvement of South African forces under the SADC Mission in DRC, or SAMIDRC, presented two significant challenges for the M23 group that had captured Mubambiro on January 23.

The M23 commander said this reporter, “At first, we thought SAMIDRC would not participate.”

But at about 2:00 pm on January 23, the South African forces at Mubambiro escaped from their camp, took up positions, and started shooting at the M23 soldiers. About five hours had passed since the rebels believed they had seized the military barracks with minimal opposition.

According to the officer, FDLR militia fighters, regular FARDC troops, European mercenaries, and a coalition of FARDC special forces (Hiboux) had escaped from combat here earlier that day.

During the January fight of Mubambiro, M23 captured an APC.

Coalition reinforcements, including infantry battalions, tanks, and fighter jets, arrived from Goma in addition to the South Africans joining the conflict.

On January 23, M23 reinforcements in the form of the 2nd battalion arrived as intense fighting broke out.

The fighting went on until the South African SAMIDRC troops raised the white flag, which in wartime denotes defeat, at roughly five in the morning on January 25.

The M23 officer claimed that at least a dozen South African soldiers were killed in the conflict, and that “the coalition suffered heavily, both in terms of casualties and equipment.” “Despite the fact that SAMIDRC had attacked us in May 2024 in what they called Operation Caterpillar I, we didn’t think they would get involved this time,” he stated.

“We were taken aback when they unexpectedly joined the battle in a close-quarters engagement.”

Notably, the coalition forces were defeated here thanks in large part to the M23 unit that had advanced behind enemy lines and captured the Buzi-Bulengo peninsula before the bigger group from the hills north of Mubambiro.

The M23 has mostly depended on guerilla warfare, overstretching the coalition forces by creating many fronts and moving units behind the enemy lines, while having less personnel and less sophisticated military hardware.

The coalition lost two tanks in the fight of Mubambiro.

The coalition was able to evacuate one, but one flipped and was taken by M23, and the other was burned, with at least one soldier inside (its debris was still visible in front of the military installation’s entrance when we returned last month).

Numerous weapons and ammunition were also abandoned by the coalition; the South Africans alone left behind filled magazines, MG chains, anti-tank grenades, LG5 grenades, RPGs, SPG 9s, and more. When this writer visited Mubambiro earlier in February, he spotted these guns.

The body of Gen. Chirimwami was removed. 

Phase III began after Sake and Mubambiro were fully under the control of the M23.

The 2nd and 3rd battalions moved toward Goma, joining at Kasengese near Mugunga, outside of Goma, while the 1st battalion remained at Mubambiro.

Notably, on January 23, during one of the fights near Kasengese, the M23 assassinated Gen. Peter Chirimwami, the province governor of North Kivu at the time, who had come to the frontlines to help boost the spirits of the coalition forces.

An M23 commander stated, “We didn’t even know he was there, let alone knowing that he had been shot.” They only became aware of the situation when they witnessed FARDC officers hastily loading a body into a white land-cruiser and attempting to flee with it.

He added that the M23 shot the car’s tires, prompting the occupants to hasten out and flee with the body. “We knew there was something unusual about that particular causality, because FARDC don’t usually evacuate their fallen comrades,” he claimed.

“We only recovered communication devices from the car; they were able to escape with the body,” he stated. “We only discovered later that Chirimwami was the casualty in question.”

He said that during Phase III, the second and third battalions moved eastward into Goma, fighting and capturing towns along the Goma-Sake axis, such as Nzuro, Kasengese, Lac Vert, Mugunga, Kyeshero, Ndosho, Terminos, and Katindo, which is home to a significant military installation.

A fresh front is opened by special force.

Around the same time, an M23 special force moved forward from the Sake area, creating a new front in its eastward march towards Goma.

Bypassing Shove, this fourth (special) mobile group quickly advanced through Gikopo and the vicinity of Nyiragongo Mountain before reaching Goma via Nkyakagina and Rusayo after peeling off the M23 troops along the Goma-Sake axis.

The FDLR, a militia at the center of President Tshisekedi’s fight against the M23, had long found refuge in the villages along this line.

Later, in the provincial capital of Goma, the special force and the 2nd and 3rd battalions would join the M23 soldiers that had advanced down the eastern axis (Goma-Kibumba).

After losing battles along the many frontline axes, tens of thousands of coalition fighters had been fleeing to the capital, which finally fell into rebel hands on January 28.